This paper provides new evidence on the relative effectiveness of formal monetary institutions in achieving price stability.
1.

Introduction
This study presents empirical investigation of the performance of formal monetary institutions in the recent decades. Though it is well known that the informal aspects of institutions may often be at least as important as the formal ones in arriving at the intended goals of those institutions, the paper deliberately focuses on the formal, or legal, aspects of institutional mechanisms with the intension of deriving policy advice regarding the adoption of monetary institutions. Hence, the current study explores the relative effectiveness (from the standpoint of achieving price stability) of commonly (1992) and Grilli et al. (1991) .
number of countries who adopted inflation targeting regime (IT) has also been rising, the number reaching to about 40 countries in 2008.
3
The number of countries that are members of currency unions has also remarkably increased with the establishment of the European Union.
While the success of all these institutional arrangements is likely to benefit from the lack of fiscal dominance and financial market development 4 , the success of the hard peg mechanisms require even more stringent circumstances. Specifically, the benefits of currency boards (CB) exceed the costs of losing monetary policy independence usually when the country is small and it pegs its currency to the hard currency of the major trading partner. For monetary unions (MU), an extended set of conditions that define "optimal currency area" are viewed essential for net benefits from such arrangement to be reaped (Edwards, 2006) . It should also be noted, that several countries have adopted a combination of these monetary institutions; specifically, currency unions and independent central banks have usually also adopted the IT regime.
In what follows, Section 2 presents the data and empirical analysis employed to explore the associations between CBI, CB, MU, IT, on the one hand, and inflation, on the other. Section 3 concludes.
Data, Methodology and Empirical Evidence
The Appendix reports the latest information available, to my best knowledge, on the CBI Table 1 shows that all of these monetary institutions, with the exception of CB, are positively correlated with the developed country dummy (DC). In addition, the CBI index and the MU dummy show notable positive associations with the IT dummy. The number of observations of the cross-section sample used in the following analysis is 139, mainly constrained by availability of data on either inflation or CBI. Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, I investigate the impact of monetary institutions on inflation using a simple OLS regression, after correcting for possible heterogeneity in the error terms using the White-heteroskedasticity method. The basic regression estimated is as follows:
where α is the constant term, β i 's are the coefficient terms that are hypothesized to be negative, ε i 's are the random error terms; and i is the country indicator. Following the discussion in the Introduction on the higher likelihood of success of CB in small countries, the regression is extended also to control for a dummy variable for small-countries (S). In addition, to account for other possible omitted variables, a dummy for developed countries (DC) is added. Table 2 reports these regression results, where the last column includes the extended version of Equation (1). Table 2 
